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Abstract. While user dependence on ICT is rising and the information security 
situation is worsening at an alarming rate, IT industry is not able to answer ac-
curately and in time questions like “How secure is our information system?” 
Consequently, information security risk management is reactive and is lagging 
behind incidents. To overcome this problem, risk management paradigm has to 
change from reactive to active and from qualitative to quantitative. In this  
section, we present a computerized risk management approach that enables ac-
tive risk management and is aligned with the leading initiative to make security 
measurable and manageable. Furthermore, we point out qualitative methods de-
ficiencies and argue about the importance of use of quantitative over qualitative 
methods in order to improve accuracy of information security feedback infor-
mation. Finally, we present two quantitative metrics, used together in the mod-
el, and enabling a quantitative risk assessment and support risk treatment  
decision making.  
Keywords: computer security, economics of security, risk management,  
security metrics, security measurement. 
1 Introduction 
Information security risk management is still in its early stages with regards to 
measuring and quantitative assessment. Currently, risk assessment is normally based 
on qualitative measurement and metrics. The consequent undesirable side-effect is 
that risk assessment cannot provide answer to questions like “How safe is my 
information system (IS)?” and “How much safer is my IS then my competitors’ IS? 
Decision making under such uncertainty is not effective. Currently, decision makers 
react on incidents rather than be proactive. This lagging reaction results in notable 
losses. Risk management paradigm has to change from reactive to proactive, where 
risks are identified, assessed and treated in time, before incident takes place. 
Furthermore, risk management is also about financial investment into security 
safeguards. Therefore, their spending should be justified as much as possible. This is 
possible only when decision makers have adequate information to evaluate 
discrepancy between desired and actual risk. Based on this information, appropriate 
and economically sound safeguards are implemented to reduce risk to a level 
acceptable for organization and stakeholders.  
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New research steps are presented in this subsection and are aiming towards 
computerized quantitative risk management for decision making support. First, we 
will present basic definitions and open problems in this area. Next, we will focus on 
risk assessment methodology and will address measurement and metrics issues. 
Finally, we will present technological architecture that enables reactive and proactive 
risk management in modern IS.  
2 Basic Definitions 
The normative reference, which is most relevant for risk management in IS, is 
ISO/IEC 27000-series standards for information security management systems. 
According to ISO/IEC 27000 [9] information security means preservation of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information.  
• “Confidentiality is a property of system that information is not made available or 
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or socio- and/or technical processes”.  
•  “Integrity is a property of protecting accuracy and completeness of assets. There 
are many types of assets, tangible assets like (i) information, (ii) software, (iii) 
hardware, (iv) services, (v) people and also intangible assets like (vi) reputation”.  
•  “Availability is a property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an 
authorized entity”.  
• Furthermore, and according to ISO/IEC 27000, information security may include 
preservation of other properties, such as authenticity, accountability,  
non-repudiation and reliability.  
Concepts defined above are only meaningful in practice when they are linked to 
organization’s assets and selected as operational requirements. Assets are valuable to 
organization and other stakeholders as well as to various threat agents. Therefore, an 
appropriate security assurance method has to be chosen in order to achieve 
organization’s and stakeholders’ confidence that assets satisfy the stated information 
security requirements and consequently its security policy and/or applicable law like 
[6]. For example, when organization provides service to its customers, a process 
security assurance method is chosen, like ISO/IEC 27001 [10]. Next, the method is 
applied to ensure that assets (including IS and IS services) conform to security 
requirements. In this way, correct, efficient and economically sound safeguards are 
implemented that protect assets from threat agents in such way that risk is reduced to 
a level acceptable for both organization and stakeholders. Risks have to be constantly 
monitored and when any risk factor changes then the process has to be repeated again 
in timely manner. This continuous activity is called information security risk 
management (risk management for short). Before we advance with risk management 
and its activities some additional basic terms have to be defined.  
According to ISO/IEC 27000 information security risk (risk for short) means 
potential that a threat will exploit a vulnerability of an asset or group of assets and 
thereby cause harm to an organization and consequently cause harm to stakeholders. 
Vulnerability is a weakness of an asset or safeguard that can be exploited by a threat. 
Threat is a potential cause of an information security incident (incident for short).  
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We can now focus on risk management, which is, according to ISO/IEC 27005 
[12], comprised of coordinated activities that aim to direct and control an organization 
with regard to risk. First, organization’s business context has to be established that is 
foundation for further activities. Within this context, risks have to be identified. Next, 
risk assessment takes place where risk are qualitatively or better quantitatively 
described and prioritized against organization’s risk evaluation criteria. Subsequently, 
risks have to be treated to achieve security requirements and correct, efficient and 
economically sound means of managing risk have to be implemented1. These means 
are called safeguards2 which include policies, processes, procedures, organizational 
structures, and software and hardware functions. Depending upon safeguards 
objectives risk treatment can be accomplished in four different ways: (i) risk 
reduction, (ii) risk retention, (iii) risk avoidance and/or (iv) risk transfer. Finally, if 
risk treatment is satisfactory then any residual risk is accepted. Risk management is 
continuous “Plan-Do-Check-Act” process, because risk factors may change abruptly 
and this may lead to undesirable consequences. Thus, risk and safeguards need to be 
monitored, reviewed and improved, when necessary.  
3 Open Problems 
Information security researches are facing challenge, because current risk 
management practice is reactive and it is lagging behind incidents. This practice has 
adverse impact to the level of business objectives achieved and results in huge 
damages due to following reasons.  
• Plan and Do Problems. Safeguards may be not correct and/or effective enough to 
protect assets from harm. Software (including security software) is buggy and single 
attack can disable safeguards and expose assets. In addition, threat landscape is con-
stantly changing and future threats are not anticipated in time, because (i) business 
contexts of organizations are changing, (ii) user dependence on ICT is rising and (iii) 
ICT grows in size and complexity and (iv) ICT interdependencies is increasing.  
• Check and Act Problems. Incapability to provide answers to security and risk related 
questions in time means that security cannot be managed efficiently, e.g., “How se-
cure is the organization?” or “What is the degree of information security risk?”.  
Logical consequence of this incapability is wider window of vulnerability [16] and in-
creased duration of asset exposure. Thus, probability of information security incident 
is greater on average. Eventually, answer to two questions above is provided when 
risk manifests itself as incident and assets are damaged. Finally, risk management 
reacts on this lagging (human perceptible) indication. At this (too late) point, organi-
zations as well as stakeholders perceive that security requirement are not fulfilled and 
risk level is unacceptable.  
                                                          
1
 Other product assurance methods such as Systems Security Engineering – Capability maturity 
Model [8] and/or process assurance methods such as Common Criteria [7] are used to ensure 
safeguard correctness and efficiency. ISO/IEC TR 15443-2 [13] lists a comprehensive list of 
assurance frameworks. 
2
 Safeguards are also known as controls or countermeasures. Standard ISO/IEC 27002 [11] 
provides a comprehensive list of safeguards. 
232 I. Starc and D. Trček 
 
How are these problems addressed in information security research? On one hand, 
new security mechanisms [1] are studied to overcome brittleness of software and to 
safeguard IS more effectively. In parallel with this effort, new product security 
assurance methods are developed to evaluated security mechanism’s strength as well 
as process assurance method to evaluate correctness of security mechanism’s design, 
implementation, integration with the IS and deployment.  
On the other hand, no security mechanism or security assurance method seems to be 
perfect to this point. Risk factors may change abruptly and ISs are changing, so 
statistically relevant long-term data is not available to enable security forecasting and 
information security insurance practical. Therefore, risk has to be reduced and this means 
safeguards have to be constantly monitored, reviewed and last but not least, improved, 
when necessary. This is possible only if information security feedback is accurate and is 
provided in real-time. Only then, decision makers have adequate information.  
Detection of security precursor before incident takes place and risk forecasting ability 
is a research priority. In order to accomplish this, better security measurements methods 
have to be defined that are (i) accurate, (ii) real-time, (iii) economically sound, and (iv) 
measure security attributes according to business requirements. Security attribute 
measurement takes place on various IS objects, e.g., on routers, workstations, personal 
computer, etc. Acquired raw data can be then interpreted using metrics/indicators that are 
in fact analytical models, which take basic measurements as an input and return 
organization’s information security state. This feedback information should be provided 
to decision maker as soon as possible in order to enable pro-active risk management 
rather than reactive. Thus, leading indicators should be chosen over lagging indicators, to 
prevent incident rather than to detect and manage incidents.  
The indicator output is manually or computationally compared to organization’s 
own risk evaluation criteria and risk management action is taken if necessary. Using 
described measurement and metrics as a foundation, security research aims to create 
also self-adapting security information and event management systems (SIEM) [2] 
that take actions based upon indicators values and measurements.  
Before we advance towards computerized risk assessment for proactive risk 
management, we will analyze current risk assessment practices as well as address 
security metrics and measurement issues and provide some problem solutions.  
4 Current Risk Assessment Methodology 
The most elementary approach to risk assessment starts with identification of a set of 
assets { }naaaA ,...,, 11=  and threats { }ntttT ,...,, 21= . Next, a Cartesian product is 
formed ( ) ( ) ( ){ }mn tatataTA ,,...,,,, 1211=× . The value of each asset ( )nav  is 
determined and, for each threat, the probability of interaction with asset during certain 
period is assessed ( )mn tEa . An interaction is problematic only if asset is exposed to 
vulnerability ( ) [ ]1,0∈nm aVt . Taking this into account, an appropriate risk estimate is 
obtained as following.  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )nmmnnmn aVttEaavtaR ∗∗=,                                   (1) 
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The real problem with this procedure is obtaining exact quantitative values for the 
above variables in real-time for the following reasons.  
• Old statistical data are not available, because the technological landscape and IS 
change quickly to meet evolving business requirements. Within these changes, new 
vulnerabilities are created. In addition, different threats are attracted at different 
time, because business context and assets change over time. Consequently, likelih-
ood of attack and number of vulnerabilities and exposures change over time. 
• Furthermore, a substantial proportion of an organization’s assets are intangible 
assets, such as information and goodwill. Identification and valuation of these as-
sets remains a difficult issue [4]. Even worse, the most important asset is person-
nel. Due to the specifics of this type of assets their valuation is very hard. For  
example, none of them are recorded and valued in balance sheets. 
Therefore, it is hard to derive the exact value of risk. The above facts lead to the current 
view that the logical alternative to quantitative IS risk assessment is a qualitative 
approach at the level of aggregates. Here, assets, threats, and vulnerabilities are each 
categorized intro certain classes. By using tables, such as one below, risks are assessed 
and estimated, and priorities are set by rank-ordering data on an ordinal scale.  
Table 1. The ISO/IEC 27005 risk assessment matrix measures risk on a scale of 0 to 8 and 
takes two qualitative inputs: (i) likelihood of an incident scenario and (ii) the estimated 
business impact. For example, if the estimated likelihood of incident scenario is low and the 
corresponding business impact is high, then the risk is described by the value 4. 
 
Likelihood of Incident Scenario 
Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Business 
Impact 
Very Low 0 1 2 3 4 
Low 1 2 3 4 5 
Medium 2 3 4 5 6 
High 3 4 5 6 7 
Very High 4 5 6 7 8 
This is also a legitimate approach according to standards, such as ISO/IEC 27005. 
However qualitative risk assessment approaches have significant shortcomings and 
suffer from the following two major disadvantages [3]. 
• Reversed rankings, i.e., assigning higher qualitative risk ratings to situations that 
have lower quantitative risks.  
• Uninformative ratings, i.e., (i) frequently assigning the most severe qualitative risk 
label (such as “high”) to scenarios with arbitrarily small quantitative risks and (ii) 
assigning the same ratings to risk that differ by many orders of magnitude.  
Therefore, the value of information that qualitative risk assessment approaches 
provide for improving risk management decision making can be close to zero and 
misleading in many cases of many small risks and a few large ones, where qualitative 
ratings often do not distinguish the large risk from the small. This is further 
justification that quantitative risk treatment has always to be the preferred option, if 
metrics and measurement methods are available.  
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5 Metrics and Measurement Problems 
The very first activity for successful risk assessment is data collection. These data 
should include new threats, identified vulnerabilities, exposure times and the available 
safeguards. This collection and dissemination of data should be in real time to ensure 
a proactive approach to risk management and also self-adapting security systems. In 
order to accomplish this, acquisition and distribution process have to be automated.  
It needs to be emphasized that, although security in IS has been an important issue 
for a few decades, there is a lack of appropriate metrics and measurement methods. 
During measurement activity, numerals are assigned to measures under different rules 
that lead to different kinds of scales.  
Qualitative scale types are nowadays used predominantly for information security 
measurements. Under Steven’s taxonomy [23], they are classified as nominal 
(categorical) and ordinal. Ordinal scales determine only greater or lesser operation 
between two measurements. The difference operation between two measurements is 
not allowed and has no meaning, because successive intervals on the scale are 
generally unequal in size. Nevertheless, statistical operations such as mean and 
standard deviation are frequently performed on rank-ordering data, but conclusions 
drawn from these operations can be misleading.  
Instead, quantitative scale types, such as interval and ration scales, should be used 
to outcome shortcomings described above and consequently, to provide more accurate 
feedback information. Some important advances have been achieved towards 
quantitative vulnerability metrics recently. The first such advances are constituted by 
two databases, the MITRE Corporation Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures [18] 
and U.S. National Vulnerability Database [19]. These are closely related efforts in 
which online acquisition and distribution of related data have been enabled by the 
security content automation protocol SCAP [21]. The main procedure with the first of 
the databases is as follows.  
• The basis is the ID vulnerability, which is an 11-digit number, in which the first 
three digits are assigned as a candidate value (CAN), the next four denote the year 
of assignment, and the last four denote the serial number of vulnerability or expo-
sure in that year.  
• Once vulnerability is identified in this way, the CAN value is converted to com-
mon vulnerability and exposure (CVE).  
The data contained in this database are in one of two states. In the first state there are 
weaknesses with no available patch and in the second state are those variables for 
which a publicly available patch exists.  
This is the basis for the metric called daily vulnerability exposure DVE [14]. DVE 
is conditional summation formula to calculate how many asset vulnerabilities were 
public at given date with no corresponding patch and thus possibly leaving a 
calculated number of assets exposed to threat. DVE values are obtained as follows.  
( ) ( ) ( )∑ >∧<= svu patcheddisclosed dateDATEdateDATEdateDVE ln              (2) 
DVE is useful to show whether an asset is vulnerable and how many vulnerabilities 
contribute to asset’s exposure. In addition, derived DVE trend metric is useful in risk 
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management process to adjust security resources to keep up with rate of disclosed 
vulnerabilities. Also, additional filtering can be used with DVE such as Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [17] to focus on more severe vulnerabilities 
and exposures. But extra care should be taken when interpreting filtered results, 
because CVSS filter takes qualitative inputs for quantitative impact evaluation and 
suffers from same deficiencies as similar qualitative risk assessment approaches.  
Another useful metric for our purpose has been proposed by Harriri et al., called 
the vulnerability index VI [5]. This index is based on categorical assessments of the 
state of a system: normal, uncertain, or vulnerable. Each network node has an agent 
that measures the impact factors in real time and sends its reports to a vulnerability 
analysis engine. The vulnerability analysis engine VAE statistically correlates 
received data and computes component or system vulnerability and impact metrics. 
Impact metrics can be used in conjunction with risk evaluation criteria to assess and 
prioritize risks.  
More precise description of VI calculation will be demonstrated for the following 
fault scenario FSk. During normal network operation, node’s transfer rate is TRnorm. 
Transfer rate may deviate around this value but should not fall below TRmin. For each 













                               
 (3) 
Having all CIF values, the component operating state COS can be computed. For each 
fault scenario FSk, a operational threshold d(FSk) is set according to organization’s 
risk acceptance criteria. Next, CIF value is compared to the operational threshold 
d(FSk). The resulting COS value equals 1 when the component operates in an 
abnormal state and 0 when it operates in a normal state.  













                                  
 (4) 
Finally, a system impact factor SIF can be computed that identifies how a fault affects 
the whole network and shows the percentage of components operating in abnormal 
states, i.e., where CIF exceeds normal operational threshold d(FSk), in relation to the 
total number of component. The obtained SIF value can be used can be used in 
conjunction with risk evaluation criteria to assess and prioritize risks.  









                          
           (5) 
At the end of this sub-section, graph based methods need to be mentioned, which are 
often used in IS risk assessment and management. One well-established technique in 
this field is suggested by Schneier [22] and is called attack trees. Attack trees model 
security of system and subsystems. They support decision making about how to 
improve security, or evaluate impacts of new attacks. Rote nodes are the principal 
goals of an attacker and leaf nodes at the bottom represent different attack options. 
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Intermediate nodes are placed to further refine attacks towards the root node. Nodes 
can be classified into two categories. When attack can be mounted in many different 
ways, an “OR” node is used. When attack precondition exists, an “AND” node is 
used. After the tree is constructed, various metrics can be applied, e.g., cost in time 
and resources to attack or defend, likelihood of attack and probability of success, or 
statements about attack such as “Cheapest attack with the highest probability of 
success”.  
6 Towards a Computerized Risk Management Architecture 
The basis towards computerized risk management is MITRE’s initiative called 
“Making Security Measurable and Manageable” [15]. This initiative has the following 
structural elements: (i) standardized enumeration of common information security 
concepts that need to be shared such as vulnerabilities, (ii) languages for encoding 
and communicating information on common information security concepts,  
(iii) repositories for sharing these concepts, and (iv) adoption of the above elements 
by the community through the use of defined program interfaces and their 
implementations. The initiative is focused on operational level of risk management. 
Many leading industry security products [20] are already SCAP standard validated, 
and utilize above described benefits.  
Our approach [24] follows the above structure, builds on it (the implementation is 
still an on-going process), and can be used to improve risk management on strategic 
and/or tactical level with the development of business flight simulators. In addition, 
these simulators may be used for automated support of decision-making and could be 
thus self-adapting security information and event management systems enablers. The 
IS security environment is complex and it is comprised of information technology and 
human factor. Because analytical solutions in complex systems are exceptions, we 
have to rely on computer simulations. Based on this and on the measurement 
apparatus developed so far, our approach works as follows (see Fig 1).  
With regard to achieve efficient risk management, simulations have to be as much 
realistic as possible. Thus, simulators use two real-time data-feeds.  
The US National Vulnerability Database serves as a data-feed for detecting 
vulnerabilities and exposures of assets. The architecture communicates with the 
database (or tools provided in the footnote) via SCAP protocol. For example, DVE is 
calculated by querying the database for each organization’s IS asset.  
1. Another data-feed is provided through SIF infrastructure where agents monitor the 
status of nodes in the observed system. Agents and monitoring nodes communicate 
via SNMP protocol. 
In order to successfully correlate organization’s asset with newly discovered 
vulnerabilities and exposures, these have to be registered in NVD. Thus, this data-
feed enables reactive risk management. Next data-feed enables proactive risk 
management, because likelihood and impact of attack is assessed in real-time, 
regardless if vulnerabilities or exposures are registered in NVD.  




Fig. 1. General Information Technology Risk Management (GIT-RM) model 
The numerical representation of acquired data is then used in the simulation model. 
The aim of simulation is determining dynamics of risk factors to derive information 
security risk dynamics. The causal dependency of risk factors can be explained in the 
following way. In the centre of the analysis are assets and threats. Assets are exposed 
to threats due to their various vulnerabilities. The interaction of threats with 
vulnerable assets leads to risks. The longer assets are exposed to threats, the higher is 
the probability of successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities, and therefore the 
higher the risk. In line with time delayed risk perception, it takes some time to 
implement appropriate safeguards to reduce exposure period, threat probability and/or 
asset’s vulnerability. After implementation of safeguards according to organization’s 
risk acceptance criteria, some portion of risk may remain effective and is referred to 
as residual risk.  
The mathematical model that formalizes description above [25] is based on first-
order differential calculus and is originally provided in Vensim syntax. We present its 
state-space representation to provide some insight into model characteristics. The 
internal states, like asset value, are represented by vector x(t). Vector u(t) describes 
inputs, such as arising threats or vulnerability disclosure and y(t) is output vector to 
derive residual risk. The system output is defined by functions h(t, x(t), u(t)), while 
the system state can change with respect to current state and its inputs and it is 
modelled with functions f(t, x(t), u(t)). Due to causal dependencies of risk factors and 
consequently their representation in equations, this system is classified as non-linear. 
For example, asset vulnerability and safeguard investment states are mutually 
depended. This system is also time-variant, because it can change in the simulation 
time, due to PDCA risk management process.  
( ) ( )( )










                                                   (6) 
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7 Conclusion 
User dependence on ICT is rising, primarily because of ever-increasing number of 
customers that use and rely on electronic services. The value of electronic business is 
also rising with it and the amount of personal information on Internet is nowadays 
greater than ever before. Secondarily, the complexity of ICT is increasing. As a 
consequence, it is more and more difficult to assure security requirements for such 
systems. Furthermore, some traditional risk assessment techniques are no longer 
satisfactory for efficient risk management.  
These factors together with the fact that exposed assets can be exploited 
automatically, remotely and with low risk, increasingly attract threat agents in 
cyberspace. Recent attacks on industrial infrastructure in 2010-2011 revealed that the 
attacks are becoming more advanced and targeted. Attackers also make great profits 
because risk management is reactive rather proactive. Thus, risk management 
paradigm has to change in order to increase odds of a timely risk identification and 
incident prevention.  
In this section, we present a computerized risk management approach that supports 
active risk management and is architecturally aligned with MITRE’s initiative. We 
argue that quantitative methods should be always preferred over qualitative in order to 
improve accuracy of risk assessment and efficiency of risk management. Thus, our 
approach is based on quantitative methods (DVE and SIF) and uses quantitative 
measurements provided by NVD and monitoring agents in observed system. Self-
adapting security information and event management systems will be successful only 
if accurate information security feedback is provided.  
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